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Abstract
This paper constructs agribusiness model of coping 
strategies in the face of heterogeneous consumer groups 
with different green agricultural preferences. We assume 
that agribusiness will make a choice in the three modes of 
production: green production mode, non-green production 
mode and hybrid production mode; and consumers get 
their utility through their own preferences and retail price 
of the two agricultural products, and then determine to 
purchase a higher utility agricultural products. We make 
quantitative analyze on production modes selection, 
pricing strategy and yield of the two products of green 
supply chain, and get that the existence of hybrid 
production mode needs to meet certain conditions, and its 
presence can lead to higher profits. At the same time, we 
find that the distribution of heterogeneous customer, ratio 
of real green agricultural products, the unit cost of green 
products and the value of the discount factor will have an 
impact on the production modes selection, and the use of 
numerical analysis further validate the conclusions.      
Key words:  Heterogeneous customer; Green 
agricultural products; Production mode
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INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the national economy, 
the living standard of consumers has been improved and 
consumers no longer just pursue the satisfaction of daily 
needs, but begin to pay attention to the quality of life. 
After the emergence of Hogwash oil, lean meat powder, 
poisoned rice and other food trust crisis, people pay more 
and more attention on these food safety issues and the 
consumption of green agricultural products has become 
a trend. However, different with the popular situation 
in other countries, green agricultural products in China 
faced with various problems and develop slowly. First 
of all, there is a problem of excessive pricing. From the 
perspective of agricultural enterprises, in order to deal 
with those problems such as small target consumers, 
high supermarket admission fee and other costs, they 
have to increase sales prices, which lead to that the price 
of green agricultural products are generally higher than 
the average price of non-green agricultural products 2-3 
times. Though consumers are very willing to pay extra for 
green agricultural products, but the premium should be 
maintained at 10%-20%. Secondly, agribusiness is caught 
in production mode selection including green production 
mode, non-green production mode and hybrid production 
mode.
The dilemma of enterprise has aroused wide attention 
from academic circles. Price strategy is helpful to improve 
the operation quality and benefit of the supply chain, and 
realize the coordination of green supply chain. Some 
scholars put forward the value of the discount factor 
to represent the price interval that consumers willing 
to pay more for the green products because they have 
a preference for it and get the optimal price of green 
products by discussion, and make the profits of green 
supply chain to maximize (Zheng et al., 2013; Zhang et 
al., 2014; Jiao et al., 2007). However, the above papers 
only research on single production mode, and lack the in-
depth analysis of the hybrid production mode. Groznik 
(2010) constructs a pricing model of store brand and 
national brand which directly competing with each other, 
and pointed out that selling the two kinds of products 
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at the same time can improve the negotiation ability of 
retailer and gain extra profits. Hybrid production mode 
providing higher profits have become a consensus (Xiao 
et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2013). 
And also in recent  years,  the distr ibution of 
heterogeneous customer has become a major focus among 
strategy researchers and practitioners as an essential 
element of a firm’s competitive strategy.
We show that it is imperative for managers to know 
whether customers are price or lead time sensitive based 
on the simultaneous dependence of price and demand on 
delivery time before selecting a time-based competitive 
strategy. Considering consumer heterogeneity in product 
attribute preferences and scholars find that the equilibrium 
outcome depends on the cost efficiencies of the production 
technologies as well as the consumer sensitivity to 
product fit (Ray, 2004). Also, the research finds the exists 
of heterogeneous customer relieves the price pressure for 
the firm as it satisfies consumer needs better and enables 
higher price premiums (Xia et al., 2009). 
In view of the above problems, we introduce the 
assumptions of the model and its rationality in the second 
part. And we discuss the profits of three production 
models under centralized and decentralized conditions in 
the next three parts. Furthermore, we analyze the effects 
of parameters on production mode selection and make 
numerical analysis in the next two parts.
1 .   M O D E L  D E V E L O P M E N T  A N D 
ANALYSIS
Using Chiang et al. (2003) and Zhang et al. (2014) for 
reference, we denote the consumers’ value for green 
agricultural products by , and let θv(0<θ<1) denote the 
consumers’ valuation for non-green agricultural products. 
Moreover, we assume v is subject to uniform distribution 
of [0,1], and has a continuous probability density function, 
f(v), and a cumulative distribution function, f(v). At the 
market, the retailer sells the green agricultural products at 
retail price, and the non-green agricultural products is sold 
at retail price . Therefore, a consumer’s utility by buying 
green agricultural products is given as 
   Ug=v-Pg , (1)
and the utility that a consumer buys agricultural products 
is described as 
   Un=θv-Pn. (2)
Considering the heterogeneity of customer problems, 
assuming that in the market there is some consumers hold 
a questioning attitude to green agricultural products which 
accounted for, and the other consumers believe that green 
agricultural products are all green agricultural products 
really which accounted for, thus we can know consumers 
can be divided as follows:
α:                   Ug=k(v-Pg )+(1-k)(θv-Pg ) ,
Un=θv-Pn .
1-α:                               Ug=v-Pg ,
Un=θv-Pn .
We assume that agricultural enterprise offers 
supermarket the green and non-green agricultural products 
at wg and wn, and the unit cost of green agricultural 
products is Cg, and the unit cost of non-green agricultural 
products is zero, while the rest of the processing cost 
is zero. In addition, we assume that the two kinds 
of agricultural products the unit consumption on the 
production capacity is equal, and the above information 
for the members of the whole supply chain is a total 
information. 
According to the above assumptions, in the market 
there are two kinds of consumers, and some consumers 
will buy green agricultural products for the utility it 
brought is greater than zero and greater than the non-
green agricultural products brought; and the other part of 
consumers will buy non-green agricultural products for 
similar reason. The relationship between consumer utility 
and demand is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 
The Relationship Between Consumer Utility and 
Demand
The agricultural enterprises supplies the green and 
non-green agricultural products to the retailer at a 
wholesale price, wg and wn, and incurs a unit cost, Cg and 
0, respectively. In addition, we assume that Cn ≤ θ. We 
assume that the agricultural enterprise is the leader of the 
Stackelberg game, and the order of this decision model 
is as follows: Agricultural enterprise first determines the 
wholesale price as the demand forecasted in the market 
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considered, then the supermarket determines the retail 
price according to the determined wholesale price. The 
decision model is to get the optimal production mode 
and sale prices at the condition that every member in the 
supply chain gain its optimal profits. The retailer’s profits 
are determined by
πr=Dg (Pg-ωg )+Dn (Pn-ωn ) ,
The agricultural enterprises’ profits are determined by
πs=Dg (ωg-Cg )+Dn ωn.
2.  SINGLE GREEN PRODUCTION MODE 
(GM)
In the case of producing single green agricultural products, 
we consider the sequential decision model of supply chain 
of the agricultural enterprise and supermarket. For the 
part customers who have the questioned attitude to green 
agricultural products, the utility that green agricultural 
products bring is Ug=k(v-Pg )+(1-k)(θv-Pg); and for the 
other β=1-α part hold firmly believe attitude of green 
agricultural products, the utility of green agricultural 
products is Ug=v-Pg; the two parts of the customers will 
buy green agricultural products only in the condition that 
the utility of green agricultural products is positive, then 
we can get the demand of green agricultural products as 
follows:
Dg=αDgα+βDgβ
in which
��� =1 � � 1� ��
��������
�� � 1 � ����������，
���= 1 � � 1��� �� � 1 � �� .
  We first consider the centralized decision-making model, the optimal pricing strategy of green agricultural 
products in the perspective of supply chain:
Max 
Max ߨ௦௖ ൌ ܦ௚൫ ௚ܲ െ ܥ௚൯ ൌ ቆߙ ቀͳ െ ௉೒௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ+ሺͳ െ ߙሻ൫ͳ െ ௚ܲ൯ቇ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ܥ௚൯
  we have 
பగೞ೎ಸ಴
ப௉೒ ൌ ͳ െ ቀͳ െ ߙ ൅
ఈ
௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ ൫ʹ ௚ܲ െ ܥ௚൯,
డమగೞ೎ಸ಴
డ௉೒మ ൌ െʹ ቀͳ െ ߙ ൅
ఈ
௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ ൏ Ͳ，
  which shows that πscGC is concave in Pg , then it is obvious that
��� � � �
�� � ���
2� � 2�� � ���� � �� � ���� �
��
2  
satisfy the first order conditions, therefore we have
��� � � � �� � ���2 �
� � ���
2�� � �� � ���� 
and the profit of the whole supply chain is
����� � �� � �� � ��� � �� �
�� � ���� � �� � ���������
4�� � �� � ������ � �� � ���� � �� � �����  .
Furthermore, in decentralized decision making model, 
we obtain the following sequential decision model:
Max ߨ௦ீ ஽ ൌ ൬ͳ െ ൬ͳ െ ߙ ൅ ߙ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ൰ ௚ܲ൰ ൫ ௚߱ െ ܥ௚൯ 
  ቐߨ௠ீ஽ ൌ ൬ͳ െ ൬ͳ െ ߙ ൅
ߙ
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ൰ ௚ܲ൰ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ௚߱൯
Ͳ ൏ ௚߱ ൏ ௚ܲ ൏ ͳ
  .
Proposition 1. In decentralized decision making model, 
the corresponding optimal profits of the supermarket, the 
agricultural enterprise and the whole supply chain are:
ߨ௠ீ஽כ ൌ ൫௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏି൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯஼೒൯
మ
ଵ଺ሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯ ,
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൌ ൫௞ା஽ሺଵି௞ሻఏି൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯஼೒൯
మ
଼ሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯ ,
ߨௌ஼ீ஽כ ൌ ଷ൫௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏି൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯஼೒൯
మ
ଵ଺ሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯ . 
3.  SINGLE NON-GREEN PRODUCTION 
MODE (NM)
In the case of producing single non-green agricultural 
products, we consider the sequential decision model 
of supply chain of the agricultural enterprise and 
supermarket. For the α part customers who have the 
questioned attitude to non-green agricultural products, 
the utility that non-green agricultural products bring is 
equivalent to the utility of the other β=1-α part hold firmly 
believe attitude of green agricultural products, which is 
Un=θv-Pn; the two parts of the customers will buy green 
agricultural products only in the condition that the utility 
of non-green agricultural products is positive, then we 
can get the demand of non-green agricultural products as 
follows:
Dn=αDnα+βDnβ
in which ܦ௡ఈ ൌ ܦ௡ఉ ൌ ͳ ൈ න ͳ
ଵ
௉೙ఏ
݀ݒ ൌ ͳ െ ௡ܲߠ   .
We first consider the centralized decision-making 
model, the optimal pricing strategy of non-green 
agricultural products in the perspective of supply chain:
Maxߨௌ஼ே஼ ൌ ܦ௡ ௡ܲ ൌ ቀͳ െ ௉೙ఏ ቁ ௡ܲ .
We have ����
��
��� � 1 �
2��
� ,
�������
���� � �
2
� � �
�����
��� � �2
��� � 12
������� � �4
, which 
shows that 
������
��� � 1 �
2��
� ,
�� ���
����
2
� �
�����
��� �2
��� 12
������� �4
 is concave in Pn , then it is obvious that 
������
��� � 1 �
2��, �
������
��� �
2
� � �
�����
��� � �2
��� � 12
������� � �4
satisfy the first order conditions, therefore we 
have 
������
��� � 1
2��, �
������
���
2
� � �
�����
��� � �2
��� � 12
������ � �4
 and the profit of the whole supply chain is 
������
��� 1
2��
� ,
�������
����
2 � �
�����
��� � �2
��� � 12
������� � �4 .
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Furthermore, in decentralized decision making model, 
we obtain the following sequential decision model: 
Maxߨ௦ே஼ ൌ ቀͳ െ ௉೙ఏ ቁ߱௡.
ቊߨ௠ே஼ ൌ ቀͳ െ
௉೙
ఏ ቁ ሺ ௡ܲ െ ߱௡ሻ
Ͳ ൏ ߱௡ ൏ ௡ܲ ൏ ͳ
. 
Proposition 2. In decentralized decision making model, 
the corresponding optimal profits of the supermarket, the 
agricultural enterprise and the whole supply chain are:
ߨ௠ே஽כ ൌ ఏଵ଺,ߨ௦ே஽כ ൌ
ఏ
଼ ,ߨௌ஼ே஽כ ൌ
ଷఏ
ଵ଺
 
.
4.  HYBRID PRODUCTION MODE (HM)
We consider the sequential decision-making model in 
the food supply chain consist with supermarket and 
agricultural enterprise under the condition of producing 
green and non-green agricultural products at the same 
time. For the  part customers who have the questioned 
attitude to green agricultural products, they will buy green 
agricultural products only in the condition that the utility 
of green agricultural products is positive and bigger than 
that the utility of non-green agricultural products, which is 
Ugα>Unα and Ugα=k(v-Pg)+(1-k)(θv-Pg)>0, while Unα=θv-Pn, 
then we can get the demand of green agricultural products 
as follows:
��� � 1 � � 1
�
�����
������
�� � 1 � �� � ���1 � ���
 
.
In the same way we can know the demand of non-
green agricultural products in the hybrid mode:
��� � 1 � � 1
�����
������
���
�� � �� � ���1 � ��� �
��
�
 
 .
And for the other β=1-α part hold firmly believe 
attitude of green agricultural products, we have
���=1 � � 1������
���
�� � 1 � ��������   ,
���=1 � � 1
�����
�����
�
�� � �������� �
��
�
 
 .
It can be known that the demand of green and non-
green agricultural products in hybrid mode are as follows:
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ܦ௚ ൌ ͳ െ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ௡ܲ൯
ሺ݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ሻ
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇
ܦ௡ ൌ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ௡ܲ൯
ሺ݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ሻ
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇ െ
௡ܲ
ߠ
  .
We first consider the optimal pricing strategy of green 
and non-green agricultural products under the centralized 
decision-making model:
Max ߨ௦௖ு஼ ൌ ܦ௚൫ ௚ܲ െ ܥ௚൯ ൅ ܦ௡ ௡ܲ 
 
 ,
we have
������
��� � � �
2�� � 2�� � ��
�� � ��� �� � � � ���，
������
��� �
2�� � 2�� � ��
�� � ��� �� � � � ��� �
2��
� ，
�������
������ �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ,
�������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ，
�������
������ �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ，
�������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� �
2
� , 
 
������
��� � � �
2�� � 2�� � ��
�� � ��� �� � � � ���，
������
��� �
2�� � 2�� � ��
�� � ��� �� � � � ��� �
2��
� ，
�������
������ �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ,
�������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ，
�������
������ �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ，
�������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� �
2
� , 
  and hessian matrix is
ܪ൫ ௚ܲǡ ௡ܲ൯ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ߲ଶߨ௦௖ு஼߲ ௚ܲଶ
߲ଶߨ௦௖ு஼
߲ ௚߲ܲ ௡ܲ
߲ଶߨ௦௖ு஼
߲ ௡߲ܲ ௚ܲ
߲ଶߨ௦௖ு஼
߲ ௡ܲଶ ۙۖ
ۘ
ۖۗ .
While
�������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� � � .
And
��
�������
����
�������
������
�������
������
�������
����
�� �
4�� � � � ���
�� � ���� � � .
so we can see that hessian matrix is negative definite 
matrix. We have
��� �
�� � ���
2�� � � � ��� �
� � ��
2 , 
��� � �2, 
������ � �4 �
��� � ��� � �� � � � ������
�
4�� � � � ������ � ��  
��� � 2�� ��
��
2 , 
��� � �2, 
���� � � �4 �
��� � ��� � �� � � � ������
�
4�� � � � ������ � ��  
���
�� ��
2� � � � �
� � �, 
��� � �2, 
������ � 4 �
��� � ��� � �� � � � ������
�
4�� � � � ������ � ��  .
Furthermore, in decentralized decision making model, 
we obtain the following sequential decision model: 
ߨ௦ு஽ ൌ ܦ௚൫ݓ௚ െ ܥ௚൯ ൅ ܦ௡ݓ௡ 
Ǥ ݐǤ ቊ ߨ௠
ு஽ ൌ ܦ௚൫ ௚ܲ െ ݓ௚൯ ൅ ܦ௡ሺ ௡ܲ െ ݓ௡ሻ
Ͳ ൏ ݓ௚ ൏ ௚ܲ ൏ ͳ，Ͳ ൏ ݓ௡ ൏ ௡ܲ ൏ ͳ
 .
Proposition 3. In decentralized decision making model, 
the corresponding optimal profits of the supermarket, the 
agricultural enterprise and the whole supply chain are:
����� � �16 �
��1 � ��� � �� � � � ������
�
16�� � � � �����1 � �� ， 
����� � �8 �
��1 � ��� � �� � � � ������
�
8�� � � � �����1 � �� ， 
 
������ � ��16 �
� ��1 � ��� � �� � � � ������
�
16�� � � � �����1 � ��  .
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5.  EFFECTS OF PARAMETERS ON 
PRODUCTION MODE SELECTION
In order to analyze the effects of various parameters 
for production mode selection, we first use the control 
variable method to focus on the influence of unit 
production cost with fixed distribution of heterogeneous 
customer α, ratio of real green agricultural products k and 
value discount coefficient θ. Thus, we have Proposition4 
as follows.
Proposition 4. When  α and θ is fixed, there are:
(i) if � � �� � ��� � � �� � ���� � �� � ���� � �
�� � �� � �����
� � �� � ���� � �� � ���� � �� �
�� � ���
� � � � ��,     
� � �� � ���
 � � �� � ���� � �� � ���� � �
�� � �� � �����
� � �� � ���� � �� � ���� � �� �
�� � ���
� � � � ��,    if  then hybrid production mode is 
infeasible and the agricultural enterprise will choose the 
single green production mode;
(ii) if Ͳ ൏ ܥ௚ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ , then hybrid production 
mode is available and the agricultural enterprise will 
choose the hybrid production mode;
(iii) if ܥ௚ ൐ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇  and ܥ௚ ൐
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ 
ܥ௚ ൐ ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ  , hybrid production mode is 
infeasible and the agricultural enterprise will choose the 
single normal production mode.
6.  NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this part, we analyze the effects of the distribution 
of heterogeneous customer, the ratio of real green 
agricultural products , the unit production cost and value 
discount coefficient  on the selection of production mode, 
in which the agricultural enterprise by comparing the 
profits of three kinds of production mode to choose the 
optimal production mode. 
Figure 2
The Relationship Between  and Profits
The relationship between α and profits are shown in 
Figure 2. We use the ratio of questionable customer α to 
represent the distribution of heterogeneous customer and 
we assume that θ=0.7, k=0.7 and Cg=0.1. Obviously, α 
irrelevant to the profits of single non-green mode. We can 
see from Figure 2 that, the higher the ratio of questionable 
customer is, the lower the profits for both hybrid and 
single green mode will be. This result is intuitive that the 
larger α represents higher ratio of questionable customer 
and the lower utility that green products brings which lead 
to lower profits of hybrid and single green mode.
Figure 3
The Relationship Between  and Profits
The relationship between θ and profits are shown 
in Figure 3. We use the value discount coefficient θ 
to represent the preference of customer for non-green 
agricultural products and we assume that α=0.7, k=0.8 
and Cg=0.1. Clearly, the linear relationship between θ and 
the profits of single non-green mode lead to the result that 
the larger θ is, the higher the profits. We can also see from 
Figure 3 that, it could be a solid for the other two modes. 
This result opens doors to reveal that the higher the value 
discount coefficient θ is, the higher utility that non-green 
products bring and customer will buy more productions 
which lead to higher profits.
Figure 4
The Relationship Between  and Profits
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The relationship between k and profits are shown 
in Figure 4. We use the ratio of real green agricultural 
products k to represent the distribution of real green 
agricultural products in the market and we assume that 
θ=0.8, α=0.7 and Cg=0.1. We can see from Figure 4 that, 
the higher the ratio of real green agricultural products k 
is, the higher the profits for both hybrid and single green 
mode will be, and have no effect on single non-green 
mode. This result is intuitive that the larger k represents 
higher ratio of real green agricultural products and the 
higher utility that green products brings which lead to 
higher profits of hybrid and single green mode.
Figure 5
The Relationship Between  and Profits
The relationship between Cg and profits are shown in 
Figure 5. We assume that α=0.7, k=0.8 and θ=0.8, and 
in this condition, if hybrid production mode is available, 
there must be ܥ௚ ൏ ܥ௚௖ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ ൌ ͲǤͳ͹ , in which C
c
g 
is the critical value. We can see that in the four figures, 
when hybrid production mode is available and the profits 
it brings to agricultural enterprise is higher than other two 
production modes and it is irrelevant to the parameters. 
And we can easily get that the higher the unit cost of 
green production Cg is, the lower the profits that green 
product brings.
CONCLUSION
In the market, agricultural enterprises have been 
plagued with the production mode selection and how to 
reasonable pricing of two different quality agricultural 
products for a long time. In this paper, we assume that 
the preference for green agricultural product of consumer 
is uniform distribution in the market, and discuss the 
optimal mode of production under the condition of 
considering the distribution of heterogeneous customer, 
ratio of real green agricultural products, the unit cost 
of green products and the value discount coefficient. 
After quantitative analysis on the effects of parameters, 
we offer the optimal strategy on production mode, 
pricing and yield of the two products of green supply 
chain under various conditions. And we investigate the 
optimal policy and provide managerial insights based on 
our analysis. It will help the agricultural enterprises in 
producing and get profits improved. 
The results can be improved in the following aspects 
in the future: This paper only considers the preference 
for green agricultural product of consumer is uniform 
distribution in the market, and normal distribution can 
be considered in the further. In addition, this paper only 
considers the profits of the whole supply chain under the 
condition that agricultural enterprises as the Stackelberg 
game leader, but did not consider the welfare function 
of the whole supply chain and society. Furthermore, this 
paper only considers the situation of one agricultural 
enterprise in the market, and does not consider the 
price strategy and mode selection when there are many 
agricultural enterprises competing with each other.
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APPENDICES
Proposition 1： According to 
ߨ௠ீ஽ ൌ ൬ͳ െ ൬ͳ െ ߙ ൅ ߙ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ൰ ௚ܲ൰ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ௚߱൯ ,
we have
߲ߨ௠ீ஽
߲ ௚ܲ ൌ ͳ െ ൬ͳ െ ߙ ൅
ߙ
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ൰ ൫ʹ ௚ܲ െ ௚߱൯ǡ 
߲ଶߨ௠ீ஽
߲ ௚ܲଶ ൌ െʹ ൬ͳ െ ߙ ൅
ߙ
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ൰ ൏ Ͳǡ 
which shows that πGDm  is concave in Pg，then it is obvious that 
satisfy the first order conditions, then we have 
ߨ௦ீ ஽ ൌ ቀͳ െ ቀͳ െ ߙ ൅ ఈ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ ௚ܲቁ ൫ ௚߱ െ ܥ௚൯ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ቀͳ െ ቀͳ െ ߙ ൅
ఈ
௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ ௚߱ቁ ൫ ௚߱ െ ܥ௚൯,
  Then డగೞಸವ
డఠ೒ ൌ ͳ െ ቀͳ െ ߙ ൅
ఈ
௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ ൫ʹ ௚߱ െ ܥ௚൯,
  డమగೞಸವడఠ೒మ ൌ െʹ ቀͳ െ ߙ ൅
ఈ
௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏቁ ൏ Ͳ,
  which shows that π
GD
s  is concave in ωg , then it is obvious that
��� � � � �� � ���2�� � �� � ���� � �� � ����� �
��
2
  satisfy the first order conditions, therefore we have
� �
�
� 3�� � �� � ����4�� � �� � ���� � �� � ����� �
��
4
  and the supermarket, the agricultural enterprise and the whole supply chain are:
ߨ௠ீ஽כ ൌ ൫௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏି൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯஼೒൯
మ
ଵ଺ሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯ ,
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൌ ൫௞ା஽ሺଵି௞ሻఏି൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯஼೒൯
మ
଼ሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯ ,
ߨௌ஼ீ஽כ ൌ ଷ൫௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏି൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯஼೒൯
మ
ଵ଺ሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൫ఈାሺଵିఈሻሺ௞ାሺଵି௞ሻఏሻ൯  . 
 
Proposition 2: According to ߨ௠ே஽ ൌ ൬ͳ െ ௡ܲߠ ൰ ሺ ௡ܲ െ ߱௡ሻ 
பగ೘ಿವ
ப௉೙ ൌ ͳ െ
ଶ௉೙
ఏ ൅
ఠ೙
ఏ，
డమగ೘ಿವ
డ௉೙మ ൌ െ
ଶ
ఏ ൏ Ͳ 
, we have ߨ௠ே஽ ൌ ൬ͳ െ ௡ܲߠ ൰ ሺ ௡ܲ െ ߱௡ሻ 
பగ೘ಿವ
ப௉೙ ൌ ͳ െ
ଶ௉೙
ఏ ൅
ఠ೙
ఏ，
డమగ೘ಿವ
డ௉೙మ ൌ െ
ଶ
ఏ ൏ Ͳ ,
which shows that πNCm  is concave in Pn，then it is obvious that ��� � � � ��2  
���� � �1 � ��� ���, then
�����
��� �
1
2 �
��
�，
������
���� � �
�
� � � 
 satisfy the first order conditions, then we 
have
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���� � �1 � ��� ���, then
�����
��� �
1
2 �
��
�，
������
���� � �
�
� � � ,
which shows that πNDs  is concave in ωn，then it is obvious that ��� � �2 
���� � ��4  
����� � ���,����� �
�
�,������ �
��
��.
 
 satisfy the first order conditions, therefore we 
have 
��� � �2 
���� � ��4  
����� � ���,����� �
�
�,������ �
��
��.
 
 and the supermarket, the agricultural enterprise and the whole supply chain are:
��� � �2 
���� � ��4  
����� � ��,����
�
�,� ����
��
��.
 Proposition 3: According to
ߨ௠ு஽ ൌൌ ቆͳ െ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ௡ܲ൯
ሺ݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ሻ
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇ ቇ ൫ ௚ܲ െ ௚߱൯ ൅ ቆ
൫ ௚ܲ െ ௡ܲ൯ሺ݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ሻ
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇ െ
௡ܲ
ߠ ቇ ሺ ௡ܲ െ ߱௡ሻ , 
we have 
�����
��� � � �
2�� � 2�� � �� � ��
�� � ��� �� � � � ���，
�����
��� �
2�� � 2�� � �� � ��
�� � ��� �� � � � ��� �
2�� � ��
� ，
������
������ �
���������
������ ，
������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ，
������
������ �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� ，
������
���� � �
���������
������ �
�
�，
 and hessian matrix is
൫ ௚ܲǡ ௡ܲ൯ ൌ ൞
డమగ೘ಹವ
డ௉೒మ
డమగ೘ಹವ
డ௉೒డ௉೙
డమగ೘ಹವ
డ௉೙డ௉೒
డమగ೘ಹವ
డ௉೙మ
ൢ，
 
While                                                      
������
���� � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� � � 
��
������
����
������
������
������
������
������
����
�� �
4�� � � � ���
�� � ���� � � 
， 
       
�����
�� � � �
2�� � � � ���
�� � ��� � � 
��
�����
�� �
�����
������
�����
������
�����
�� �
�� �
4�� � � � ���
�� � ���� � � ，
so we can see that hessian matrix is negative definite matrix. We have 
௚ܲכ ൌ ሺଵିఏሻ௞ଶሺ௞ାఈିఈ௞ሻ ൅
ఏାఠ೒
ଶ ， ௡ܲכ ൌ
ఏାఠ೙
ଶ  ,
satisfy the first order conditions, then we have 
,
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we have
�����
��� �
1
2 �
2�� � 2�� � ��
2�1 � ��� �� � � � ���，
�����
��� �
2�� � 2�� � ��
2�1 � ��� �� � � � ��� �
��
� ，
������
������ �
������
������，
������
���� � �
� � � � ��
�1 � ��� ，
������
������ �
� � � � ��
�1 � ��� ，
������
���� � �
������
������ �
�
�， 
and hessian matrix is 
൫ݓ௚ǡ߱௡൯ ൌ ൞
డమగೞಹವ
డ௪೒మ
డమగೞಹವ
డ௪೒డఠ೙
డమగೞಹವ
డఠ೙డ௪೒
డమగೞಹವ
డఠ೙మ
ൢ. 
While                                                          
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲ ௚߱ଶ ൌ െ
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇ ൏ Ͳ 
 
ተተ
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲ݓ௚ଶ
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲ݓ௚߲߱௡
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲߱௡߲ݓ௚
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲߱௡ଶ
ተተ ൌ
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
ሺͳ െ ߠሻߠ݇ ൐ Ͳ 
and                                                               
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲ ௚߱ଶ ൌ െ
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇ ൏ Ͳ 
 
ተተ
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲ݓ௚ଶ
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲ݓ௚߲߱௡
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲߱௡߲ݓ௚
߲ଶߨ௦ு஽
߲߱௡ଶ
ተተ ൌ
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
ሺͳ െ ߠሻߠ݇ ൐ Ͳ ，
so we can see that hessian matrix is negative definite matrix. We have
ݓ௚כ ൌ ሺଵିఏሻ௞ଶሺ௞ାఈିఈ௞ሻ ൅
ఏା஼೒
ଶ ，ݓ௡כ ൌ
ఏ
ଶ ，
we have
.
Proposition 4: According to
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and
����� � �� � ��� � ��� � �� �
�� � ���� � �� � ���������
8�� � �� � ������ � �� � ���� � �� � �����
 
,
we know that when hybrid production mode is available, there must be Dg>0 and Dn>0, then we have 
Ͳ ൏ ܥ௚ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ 
 
ߨ௦ு஽כ െ ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൒ Ͳ 
 
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ െ ߨ௦ே஽כ ൐ Ͳ 
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚ ൐
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
 
, and as we know, 
Ͳ ൏ ܥ௚ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ 
 
ߨ௦ு஽כ െ ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൒ Ͳ 
 
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ െ ߨ௦ே஽כ ൐ Ͳ 
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚ ൐
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
 
, that is when hybrid production mode is available, its profits is 
better than other mode, and the agricultural enterprise will choose the hybrid production mode. And solve the inequality 
Ͳ ൏ ܥ௚ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ 
 
ߨ௦ு஽כ െ ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൒ Ͳ 
 
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ െ ߨ௦ே஽כ ൐ Ͳ 
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚ ൐
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
 
, we have 
Ͳ ൏ ܥ௚ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ 
 
ߨ௦ு஽כ െ ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൒ Ͳ 
 
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ െ ߨ௦ே஽כ ൐ Ͳ 
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚ ൐
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇
൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
 
,
then if
Ͳ ൏ ܥ௚ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇ 
 
ߨ௦ு஽כ െ ߨ௦ீ ஽כ ൒ Ͳ 
 
ߨ௦ீ ஽כ െ ߨ௦ே஽כ ൐ Ͳ 
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ඨ
ሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚
݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ െ ඨ
ሺ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻߠ
ߙ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݇ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻߠሻ ൐ ܥ௚ ൐
ሺͳ െ ߠሻ݇
݇ ൅ ߙ െ ߙ݇
 
,
then hybrid production mode is infeasible and the agricultural enterprise will choose the single green production mode. 
Otherwise, the agricultural enterprise will choose the single normal production mode.
